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Impartial administration of the law cannot make
inequitable laws fair.t Nevertheless, the general
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I American legal theorist William Seagle makes this
point quite clearly when he recalls Anatole France's
familiar aphorism.
The ideal ofjudicial impartiality requires alone that
whatever laws there are be administered in an im-
partial manner. It does not require that the laws
themselves be impartial. As Anatole France ob-
served, the law with magnificent impartiality forbids
the rich and the poor alike to steal a loaf of bread,
or to sleep under the bridges. Thus the impartiality
of the law simply masks the partiality of the laws,
which reflect the configurations of power in the state,
or are entirely composed of political ingredients. The
impartial administration of an unjust law can no
more make it a just law than the efficient enforce-
ment of a bad law can make it a good law.
W. Si A;i.E, L-xw: THE SCIENCE OF INEFFICIENCY 14
(1952).
Scagle is quick to observe the ironic character of
courtroom procedures designed to convey an impression
of fairness while the laws administered in those court-
rooms clearly favor different social groups and classes
and inevitably bear the imprint of the structure of power
in societ, . Judicial impartiality achieves a kind of fairness
which is obviously untroubled by drastic inequity built
into the content of the laws themselves.
Citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Su-
preme Court ruled in 1963 that state criminal procedure
denying benefit of counsel for an indigent's one and only
appeal as of right violated the fourteenth amendment,
arguing that "there can be no equal justic where the kind
of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of
money he has."' Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355
(19631. Thus by establishing an indigent's right to counsel
on appeal, the Court presumably enhanced the impartial
administration of justice.
consensus2 of those who write task force reports or
otherwise contribute to the legal literature on crim-
inal justice,3 is that the lower criminal courts in
Justice Harlan, however, was not fooled. In dissent he
pointed out that:
The States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause from discriminating between 'rich'
and 'poor' as such in the formulation and application
of their laws. But it is a far different thing to suggest
that this provision prevents the State from adopting
a law of general applicability that may affect the
poor more harshly than it does the rich, or... impose
a standard fine for criminal violations, or to establish
minimum bail for various categories of offenses. Nor
could it be contended that the State may not classify
as crimes acts which the poor are more likely to commit
than are the rich ... . [Tihe Equal Protection Clause
does not impose on the States 'an affirmative duty
to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in
economic circumstances.' To so construe it would be
to read into the Constitution a philosophy of leveling
that would be foreign to many of our basic concepts
of the proper relations between government and
society.
Id. at 361-62 [latter emphasis added]. Justice Harlan
evidently did not wish to see the inequity of law once
again masked by an impartial criminal procedure.
2 See, e.g., Oliphant, Reflections on the Lower Court System;
The Development of a Unique Clinical Misdemeanor and a Public
Defender Program, 57 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1973). Oliphant
notes that:
Observers of the lower courts throughout this coun-
try agree that the lower courts are in miserable
condition .... The appalling conditions have been
the subject of numerous investigations, criticisms
and dismay by government commissions and citizen
task forces. For the most part, the findings and
recommendations of investigators and critics have
lone unheeded.
These critics of the criminal process, however, have
not been the only ones to express their feelings on the
subject of criminal justice. See President Hoover's address
at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press (April 22,
1929):
Every student of our law enforcement mechanism
knows full well that it is in need of vigorous reorga-
nization; that its procedure unduly favors the crim-
inal; that our judiciary needs to be strengthened;
that the method of assembling our juries needs re-
vision; that justice must be more swift and sure. In
our desire to be merciful the pendulum has swung
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this country have failed to create even the illusion4
of fairness.
5
in favor of the prisoner and far away from the
protection of society.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENI (WICKERSHAM COMMISSION), REPORT ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1 (1931). More recently, former
Governor Reagan expressed his feelings on the subject.
Reagan Asserts Law Aids "The Criminal Defendant," N.Y.
Times, May 27, 1976, at 24:
In his sharpest comments of the campaign on the
law-and-order issue, Ronald Reagan said today that
he would support legislation that would change
"laws, precedents, procedures and rules of prosecu-
tion that are stacked on behalf of the criminal
defendant." The challenger for the Republican Pres-
idential nomination said that the criminal justice
system had failed the American public by imposing
rules that sheltered criminals from prosecution...."If
you want to know why crime proliferates in this
nation, don't look at the statistics on income and
wealth; look at statistics on arrests, prosecutions,
conviction and prison population."
" Fair law is really equivalent to equitable law which
is not composed of political ingredients. See note I supra.
But the present law, which is unfair, can be made to
appear fair, and hence can give the illusion of fairness, by
being administered impartially. The administrative ap-
paratus which could at least make the law seem fair has
not effectively performed that function in the American
lower criminal courts. Because these courts have failed to
administer adequately and impartially unjust laws, the
lower criminal courts do not present even the illusion of
fairness.
The importance of illusions is generally underrated.
M. FERRO, THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918 xi (1973 Eng-
lish ed.):
In 1914 they had no doubts that the war would be
short, that they would be home by Christmas
crowned with victory. In Paris, London and Berlin
they left singing and exuberant, 'with flowers on
their rifles.' This elation is a factor in the origins of
the war and of its after-taste, and deserves as much
stress as the more strictly economic or political
causes.
s "Fairness" can have a considerable variety of refer-
rents within the structure of the criminal justice system.
For example:
(1) It can describe the proper relationship between the
criminal defendant and the State. See, e.g., Justice Car-
dozo's majority opinion in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 122 (1934):
The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining
for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms
of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to
defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent
in every concept of a fair trial that could be accept-
able to the thought of reasonable men will be kept
inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be
the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice,
though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true.
Despite over half a century of criticism and
proposals, remarkably little in the way of change
(2) It can describe the proper balance between the
State and the general class of criminal defendants as a
whole. See, e.g., Goldstein, The State and the Accused- Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE LJ. 1149
(1960):
In criminal cases, the accused may get relief, not so
much out of concern for him or for the 'truth,' but
because he is strategically located, and motivated,
to call the attention of the courts to excesses in the
administration of criminal justice. The underlying
premise is that of a social utilitarianism. If the
criminal goes free in order to serve a larger and more
important end, then social justice is done, even if
individual justice is not.
(3) It can describe the proper balance between the
procedural safeguards afforded one group of criminal
defendants as against another group of criminal defend-
ants. See Wald, Poverty and Criminal Justice, THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENTr AND AD-
MINISTiRATION OFJUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORr: THE
COURTS 139 (1967):
The great majority of those accused of crime in this
country are poor. The system of criminal justice
under which they are judged is rooted in certain
ideals: that arrest can only be for cause; that defend-
ants, presumed innocent until shown guilty, are
entitled to pretrial freedom to aid in their own
defense; that a guilty plea should be voluntary; that
the allegations of wrongdoing must be submitted to
the truthfinding light of the adversary system; that
the sentence should be based on the gravity of the
crime, yet tempered by the rehabilitative potential
of the defendant; that, after rehabilitation, the of-
fender should be accepted back into the community.
To the extent, however, that the system works less
fairly for the poor man than for the affluent, the
ideal is flawed.
(4) In an "adversary system," it can describe the proper
relationship between the courtroom agents who share in
determining the defendant's fate. See Bazelon, The Defec-
tive Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1973):
The American Bar Association's Project on Mini-
mum Standards for Criminal Justice used the met-
aphor of the three-legged stool to depict the criminal
justice system-justice balanced on a tripod consist-
ing of the trial judge, the prosecutor, and the defense
counsel. If any one of those three is shorter, or
weaker, than the other two, there is an imbalance
that can result in injustice. Chief Justice Burger,
who chaired the ABA project, stated not long ago
that the most common cause of imbalance and
injustice in the system is the weakness of defense
counsel.
A Committee Report to the Third Annual Meeting of
the American Law Institute suggested: "If the defendant
is financially able to employ counsel he can have as many
as he desires, while in some states the prosecuting attorney
alone must conduct the prosecution and pecial counsel
cannot appear." Defects in Criminal Justice, 11 ABA J. 297,
298 (1925).
(5) Rather than describing a relation within the struc-
ture of criminal procedure, "fairness" may present a
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in the day-to-day operations of the lower criminal
courts has been accomplished. This article will
examine lower court problems from perspectives
which differ from those.'employed in the past.
Instead of presenting a catalogue of lower court
ills,6 this article will seek to develop a conceptual
framework for further analysis of these courts. Ad-
dressed here are three interrelated topics: the the-
ory underlying the recommendations of lower court
reform movements; the contrast between, judicial
theory and practice in the operation of the lower
criminal courts; and non-adversarial forms of crim-
inal procedure as a possible new approach to the
problems of the lower courts. This article will argue
that the problems of the lower criminal courts are
not likely to be solved without analyzing the inci-
dence and impact of lower court reform move-
valuation of that process in relation to popular wisdom
or common sense notions which people have about their
rights vis-a-vis the criminal justice system. Such percep-
tions may well reflect accurately the current state of
"official" procedural rights. See, e.g., A "Miranda Card"
Read to Suspect, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1976, at 24: "Two
'Miranda cards' were found on Mr. Miranda's body after
the slaying. The cards, on which defendants' rights are
printed, have been carried by policemen since the Su-
preme Court ruling of 1966 that requires the authorities
to inform suspects of their rights." Such perceptions may,
however, only evidence survivals of popularly recognized
but newly abolished rights. See Mesch, Human Rights, Chile
and International Organizations, 24 DE PAUL L. REv. 999,
1008 (1975). They may express the potential rights of the
criminally accused but only in their nascent form. Thus,
when in 1961, Clarence Earl Gideon told the Florida
Circuit Court that the United States Supreme Court said
he was entitled to be represented by counsel, he was
wrong. He was vindicated later by the Supreme Court
partially because, in 1961, he believed he had a right
which in fact had not as yet been recognized. Finally,
such perceptions may represent either an integrated or
disorganized ensemble of real and imagined rights. (Cf
Leo Gorcey's prolix explanation to the New York police
of his rights to fair treatment which had been guaranteed
by the "U.S. Extreme Court," in the 1946 motion picture,
BOWERY BOMBSHELL).
These virtual "theories of fairness" are frequently
mixed together throughout many of the lower criminal
court studies cited in this article.
6 It is generally agreed that the chronic symptoms of
the ills of the lower courts include, but are not limited to,
the following: The staggering volume of misdemeanor
cases, the absence of dignity and decorum in these court-
rooms, the lack of competence and integrity in court
personnel which is often accentuated by their insufficient
number, the pervasive failure to treat seriously these
courts and the people who appear in them, and the
infrequent use of defense counsel. For a more expansive
discussion of the author's perception of lower court prob-
lems, see generally Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries For All Felony
and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defend-
ants?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 88, 101-11 (1977).
ments, focusing on the vast, although not always
apparent, dichotomy between judicial theory and
practice in these courts, and recognizing the risks
implicit in the development of non-adversarial
forms of criminal procedure proposed as a solution
to the current crisis in the criminal courts.
INVESTIGATIONS WITHOuT RESULTS
America's lower criminal courts have proved
virtually impervious to any attempt at principled
reform. Frequent investigations have concluded
that these courts have failed to deal justly and
fairly with those who theoretically would be re-
formed by their contact with the criminal justice
system. Although each investigation, report, or
study was clearly the product of its own moment,
time, and author, similar conclusions concerning
lower court operations were reached regardless of
the purpose of the publication or the nature of the
authorship. Despite the apparent unanimity of
criticism, little or no change in the operation of the
lower courts has occurred.
In the wake of these repeated but seemingly
ineffective criticisms, a conference was held by the
University of Virginia Law School during the
spring of 1969, the specific purpose of which was
to address the problems of America's lower crimi-
nal courts.8 In attendance were some of the fore-
most legal scholars who had previously investigated
and reported on lower court reforms, 9 as well as the
younger generation of scholars who were just be-
ginning to take up the cause.'0 Francis Allen
7 MASS PRODUCTrION JusTiCE AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL IDEAL (C. Whitebread ed. 1970).
s Paulsen, Foreword, in C. Whitebread, supra note 7, at
vii: "The concern which lay behind the production of
this book and the conference which produced it is best
understood by recalling two lines (slightly altered) from
Longfellow's A Psalm of Life: 'Tell me not, in mournful
numbers/ Law is but an empty dream."'
Throughout the article the positions ofspecific theor-
ists writing on the lower criminal courts are in each case
developed about as far in the text as they can be. For
example, the arguments of Francis Allen, Samuel Dash,
John Robertson and others summarized or quoted in the
text exhaust the content of their positions on the lower
courts, though in other areas of law they may have
extended their analyses somewhat further. The effort is
made here to situate various reforms theorists within
general waves of historical interest in reform and this
may shed light on their theoretical positions, but to
associate individuals any more closely with historical
moments than has been attempted would probably in-
accurately portray the determinants of the positions
taken.
10 A list of the conference participants can be found in
C. Whitebread, supra note 7, at xxiii to xxv.
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opened his address to this conference" by citing an
article written almost twenty years earlier by Sam-
uel Dash, 2 who was also present at the conference.
Dash had pointed out in 1951 that the scandalous
condition of the municipal courts was virtually
identical to that recorded by the Illinois Crime
Survey of 1928. Allen recalled Dash's discourage-
ment:
There were the same problems of numbers, the same
absence of dignity and decorum, the same lack of
competence and integrity in court personnel-in
short, the same failure of justice and efficiency that
had evoked disquiet in the early 1930's. Almost two
more decades have now elapsed since Professor Dash
published his piece. If modern descriptions of the
administration of justice in small-crimes courts are
to be believed, little, if any, improvement has oc-
curred in many urban communities. 3
Despite Allen's urge for improvement, the Vir-
ginia conference accomplished little. The confer-
ence was just one in a long line of meetings, reports,
and articles where discussion of procedural reform
was the order of the day. By taking another verbal
tour of the assembly line of the lower courts, and
by discussing the retooling of that assembly line,
the conference.participants ignored the real issue.
Instead of merely voicing complaints, the partici-
pants should have been asking themselves, "Why
are we here again?" or "Why have repeated inves-
tigations of the municipal courts not led to solu-
tions?" These questions would have directed them
to an examination of the history of reform and to
a demand for action.
A chronological list of some of the more critical
and important studies of the lower criminal courts"'
suggests that the interest in the subject of "mass
production" justice has not been constant,.but has
appeared and receded over seventy-five years, ris-
ing and falling with the tides of national concern
over the effectiveness and credibility of American
institutions in general.'5 At least three waves of
" Allen, Small Crimes and Large Problems: Some Constitu-
tional Dimensions, in C. Whitebread, vupra note 7, at 74.
" Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46
ILL. L. REv. 385 (1951).
"3 Allen, supra note 11, at 74-75.
14 See e.g., J. ROBERTSON, ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPEC-
"FIVES ON LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS (1974); Pound,
The Administration of Criminal Justice in the Modem City, 26
HARV. L. REV. 302 (1913).
'
5 This assumption is based upon a survey of legal
articles and widely publicized commission reports and
analyses with at least some visibility within the legal
community. Little or no effort has been made, for ex-
ample, to locate chronologically newspaper or general
interest are discernible. The first, Roscoe Pound's
confrontation with the issues of urban criminal
justice, 6 corresponded roughly to the period of
political reform known as the Progressive Era.' 7
The second wave of investigations clustered around
the years 1929-31 and appeared during a time of
particular anxiety over the spread of criminal com-
munities and a time of rapid, if not immediately
understood, disintegration of national confidence
in social stability.' 8 Finally, the heavy concentra-
tion of interest in the lower criminal courts' failure
to achieve an image of fairness, in spite of the
expansion of procedural rights for criminal defend-
ants at an unprecedented pace during the 1960's,
arose as a third wave at a critical moment of
tension and discord in the larger society.' 9
journalistic accounts of the crises in the lower courts
because such commentary would not be directed initially
at leaders in the political and legal communities, but
rather to isolated or undifferentiated sectors of the general
reading population.
16 See R. POUND & F. FRANKFURTER, CRIMINAL JUS.
TICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORT OF THE CLEVELAND
FOUNDAION SURVEY OF rHE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO (1922).
17 American historian James Weinstein argues that
much of the impetus for the reform movements which
characterized Progressivism came from sophisticated and
concerned business and political leaders, fearful of a
decline in social stability. This contrasts with the view
that businessmen and institutions were necessarily the
targets of reform sentiment.
J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN rHi- LIB-
ERAL STATE: 1900-1918, 3 (1968):
Underlying all, or most, of the new politics of these
years was an awareness on the part of the more
sophisticated business and political leaders that the
social order could be stabilized only if it moved in
the direction of general social concern and social
responsibility..Dissatisfaction with the increasing po-
larization of American society and with the apparent
decline in the influence of some social classes created
a climate for change.
See also R. HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVE-
MiiNT 1900-1915 (1963), and THE AcE OF REFORM
(1955); G. KoLKo, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVA'ISM,
A REINTERPRErAIION OF AMERICAN HISTORY
1900-1916 (1963); R. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND RE-
FORM, A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
(1962).
18 See generally P. CONKIN, THE NEW DEAL (1967); M.
R'FHBARD, AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION (1963); A.
SCIALESINGER JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVET:r, yol. 1,
THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 1919-1933 (1957); G.
SELDES, THE YEARS OF TIHE LOcUST (1933); W. Wi.
LIAMS, THE ComrOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 343.-88
(1961).
i9 See D. HALBERS'AM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHT.
FST (1972); J. HEATH, DECADE OF DISILLUSIONMENT:
THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON YEARS (1975); A. KENDRICK,
THE WOUND WITHIN: AMERICA IN THE VIE-I'NAM
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. A theoretical explanation for this apparent re-
lationship between social instability and lower
court criticism seems clear. It is frequently noted
that the lower criminal courts are the most signifi-
cant-and sometimes only-point of contact which
most Americans will have with the criminal justice
system.2 0 Thus, during periods of national social
instability, it is possible that some focus is given to
the lower criminal courts because they become
more heavily relied upon to demonstrate the avail-
ability of justice within the existing structure of
social values and arrangements. The courts' failure
to do so at such times would seem to present an
enhanced threat to the survival of the legal system
among others.
Consistent with this theory, it is thus not sur-
prising that Francis Allen concluded his 1969 ad-
dress at the Virginia conference with the warning
that:
[Alt a time when allegiances to orderly processes of
social change are wavering and hanging in the
balance, concern for the decency of the law and its
enforcement becomes a matter of vital practical
importance. Few institutions have done more to
impair the good reputation of the law and to drain
its moral authority than the small-crimes courts in
many large cities.
2 1
Similarly, in the preface to his important contri-
bution to the exposure of municipal court proce-
dures, John Robertson suggests that:
[Tlhe lower court system continues to churn up
people and cases, providing further evidence for
Chief Justice Hughes' often quoted statement on
the importance of lower courts-a statement im-
YEARS, 1945-1974 (1974); H. MORGENTHAU, TRUTH
AND POWER: ESSAYS OF A DECADE, 1960-70 (1970); W.
O'NEII., COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF
AMERICA IN THE 1960's (1971): K. SALE, SDS (1973).
20 See J. ROBERTSON, Supra note 14, at vii:
No formal legal institution, except the police, has as
much direct contact with people as the lower courts.
For millions of people these courts embody the law
and judicial process. For most people the words
"judge," "trial." and "court" have no experiential
referent other than their encounters with the munic-
ipal, misdemeanor, traffic, and magistrate's courts of
their community..
See also THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 29 (1967); L. SILVER-
STEIN, DEFENSE OF I'HE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN
AMERICAN STATE COURTS: A FIEI.D STUDY AND RE-
PORT, NATIONAL REPORT 123-24 (1965).
2' Allen, supra note 11, at 96.
possible not to quote in a book such as this: "A
petty tyrant in a police court, refusals of a fair
hearing in minor civil courts, the impatient disre-
gard of an immigrant's ignorance of our ways and
language, will daily breed bolshevists who are be-
yond the reach of your appeals. Here is work for
lawyers. The Supreme Court of the United States
and the court of appeals will take care of themselves.
Look after the courts of the poor, who stand most in
need ofjustice. The security of the Republic will be
found in the treatment of the poor and the ignorant;
in indifference to their misery and helplessness lies
disaster". 2n
What is most interesting about these views is the
extent to which they are wrong.'s The Republic
has remained healthy in spite of the lower courts'
unchanged treatment of the poor and ignorant.
Certainly, the abuse of the poor and underprivi-
leged by the courts has not produced a class of
revolutionaries, as Mr. Justice Hughes may have
predicted. Indeed, the "immigrant's ignorance of
our ways and language"' may have actually cre-
ated a stumbling block to the political organization
of America's industrial workers and the develop-
ment of a kind of social movement which would
have justified Hughes' sense of alarm.25
To the extent that the treatment of the predom-
inantly poor class of criminal defendants in Amer-
ica's lower courts has depended upon their capacity
to respond to injustice at the hands of the courts in
an organized and politically threatening way, it
becomes less surprising that decades of lower court
investigations have proved to have had so little
effect. An essential aspect of poverty is that the
22 J. RoBERi-soN, supra note 14, at vii-viii.
23 In fairness to Justice Hughes, it should be pointed
out that he was not alone in his misgivings about the
durability of American institutions when confronted with
the potential growth of pernicious foreign ideologies,
especially if the ideologies were adopted by people from
the lower reaches of society. See M. GREEN, THE NA-
TIONAL Civic FEDERATION AND rHE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 1900-1925, at 185 (1956). SeeJ. WEINSIEIN,
supra note 17.
24 See text at note 16 supra.
25 Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American
Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1394, 1403 (1971):
Various forces seem to have contributed to the lack
of cohesion among working people in the United
States. One important factor was the network of
language, racial, and religious barriers thrown up by
repeated waves of immigration. These differences
often led to factions within the ranks of labor so that
locals and even national unions were frequently
dominated by particular ethnic groups.
See also M. KARSON, AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS AND
POLIIC-s 1900-1918 (1958).
[Vol. 69
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individual who finds himself in that economic
situation is also the person in the worst possible
social position to do anything about it. The alle-
giance of the poor to "orderly processes of social
change"' 6 may in fact represent an entirely mar-
ginal factor in any determination of whether it is
politically imperative to narrow in a dramatic way
the gap between the claims of justice and the
performance of the lower criminal courts. The
lesson learned over the years since Justice Hughes'
remarks about the relation between law and the
social system may well be that the poor are infi-
nitely expendable and that indifference to their
experience ofjustice in the lower criminal courts is
in no significant way incompatible with sustaining
the legal system or the social structure of which it
is a part. And, being a petty criminal, which is
only a more specific way of being poor, in no way
enhances one's ability to put effective pressure on
the institutions-including the courts-which
shape one's life.2
26See text accompanying note 21 supra.
2 It goes without saying that. those in power have
never particularly liked small-time criminals: thieves and
con-artists, pimps and prostitutes, drunks and drug-users,
people who make too much noise or sleep quietly but in
the doorways of banks; in short, the kind of criminal who
invariably lives in the heart of America's great cities and
inevitably spends a certain number of days (and nights)
each year waiting in the "bullpens" of the misdemeanor
and police courts. Many law students do not appear to
like them very much either. See Slovenko, Attitudes on
Legal Representation of Accused Persons, 2 AMER. CRIM. L.Q.
101 (1964). This characteristic feeling of contempt for the
lower-class criminal is well expressed by the respectable
Girondist Deputy, Monsieur Duperret in P. WEISS,
MARAI/SADE, 77 (1969):
Duperret: ... And who has he got on his side
Pickpockets layabouts parasites
who loiter in the boulevards
[indignation among the onlookers]
and hang around the cafes
Cucurucu: Wish we could
Duperret: Released prisoners
escaped lunatics
[tumult and whistling]
Does he want to rule our country
with these
Upper-class expressions of contempt and anxiety in
relation to encounters with petty-criminals do not, how-
ever, reveal the actual extent to which this criminal
element threatens "society" (i.e., the so'cial structure).
Marx and Engels, for example, viewed criminal careers
basically in terms of accommodation to the dominant
system and not as forms of political rebellion. Indeed, one
writer suggests that romanticism surrounding criminal
acts leads to the illusion that criminals can become
effective revolutionary militants and thus is antithetical
to Marxian theory.
Beyond the best intentions of reform movement
leaders, the lower criminal courts have steadfastly
Marx and Engels did not, however, accept the bour-
geoisie's own estimation of the threat to "society"
represented by the criminal. The criminal career
and the "delinquent solution," however much en-
forced by the harsh necessities of capitalism, are not
in effect forms of political rebellion against the exist-
ing order but a more or less reactionary accommo-
dation to them. The professional criminal, like all
other men, "enters into definite relations that are
... independent of their will"; he joins the ranks of
the lumpenproletariat. Like it or not, a specific class
position is forced upon him. The romanticization of
crime, the recognition in the criminal of a rebel
"alientated" from society, is, for Marxism, a danger-
ous political ideology. It leads inevitably, since the
"criminal" is an individualist abstraction of a class
position, to the estimation of the lumpenproletariat
as a revolutionary force.
Hirst, Marx and Engels on Law, Crime and Morality in
CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 218 (I. Taylor, P. Walton, J.
Young, eds. 1975). Thus the clear impression: even the
Marxists don't seem to like criminals.
Offering specific illustrations from their abundant re-
search into modem social history, both Eric Hobsbawm
and George Rude conclude that the distinction between
radicals, communards, and political mobs on the one
hand, and outlaws, bandits or criminals on the other, can
usually be drawn quite sharply.
Hobsbawm, a prolific historian of 19th and 20th cen-
tury social movements, observes that:
There is no evidence that the fluourishing under-
world of Paris provided revolutionary militants or
sympathizers in the French revolutions of the eight-
eenth and nineteenth century, though in 1871 the
prostitutes were strongly Communard; but as a class
they were victims of exploitation rather than crimi-
nals. The criminal bandit gangs which infested the
French and Rhineland countryside in the 1870s were
not revolutionary phenomena, but symptoms of so-
cial disorder. The underworld enters the history of
revolutions only insofar as the classes dangereuses are
mixed up with the classes laborieuses, mainly in certain
quarters of the cities, and because rebels and insur-
gents are often treated by the authorities as criminals
and outlaws, but in principle the distinction is clear.
E. HOBSBAWM, BANDrrS 84-85 (1969).
Rude further suggests that:
Historians have ... assumed that the "mobs" that
rioted were of this species and were of necessity
drawn from "criminal elements," the slum popula-
tion, or from "the inhabitants of the dangerous
districts ... who were always ready for pillage." Yet
this was not the case. Rioters were certainly drawn
from what Henry Fielding termed "the Mob" and
they tended to be wage-earners rather than self-
employed craftsihen, peddlars or small proprietors,
but they were rarely criminals, vagrants or the poor-
est of the poor, and in so far as any parts of the
metropolis may be said to have been more riotous
than others, they were the City, the Strand, South-
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resisted reform. Juxtaposing the successful resist-
ance to reform by the lower courts and the appar-
ent fluctuations of interest in the problem with the
political character of those groups most promi-
nently victimized by the criminal process points to
a fruitful line of inquiry. The juxtaposition indi-
cates that the failure of reform to take hold cannot
be traced to the lack of goodwill or the stupidity of
responsible officials, but that it may find its roots
in the fundamental conflict of social and political
interests. It further suggests that a prerequisite to
meaningful change in the lower courts is the aban-
donment of those premises which, while legal in
form, have proven inadequate in the past.
LOST RIGHTS
Procedural changes have been recommended as
a solution to the problems of the lower criminal
courts for half a century. During the 1960's it
appeared as though such procedural changes were
finally taking place in the American criminal jus-
tice system as part of the "criminal law revolution."
The "criminal law revolution" is generally recog-
nized as a dramatic expansion of the rights of the
criminally accused.28 Through constitutional inter-
pretations, the appellate courts-principally the
Supreme Court-created new standards for Amer-
ican criminal justice that trial courts in practice
were expected to mirror. It is questionable, how-
ever, whether the "revolution" had any impact on
the lower criminal courts, since the "revolution"
wark, Shoreditch and Spitalfields rather than St.
Giles-in-the-Fields or the shadier alleys of Holborn.
G. RUDE, WILKES AND LIBERTY 15 (1962).
Hobsbawm and Rude are discussing the relationship
between criminals and radical social movements in Eu-
rope and Britain yet there is no reason to believe the
American pattern diverges from their analysis. The anal-
ogy is troubled by the fact, pointed out by Lawrence
Friedman, that "Historians, legal and nonlegal, have
paid surprisingly little heed to the history of criminal law
and criminal justice" in this country. L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 600 (1973).
' EDITORS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER, THE
CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION AND ITs AFI'ERMATIH:
1960-1974, (1975) (dust jacket):
The revolution may be said to have begun with the
1960-61 term decision in Mapp v. Ohio (banning
illegally obtained evidence from state prosecutions)
and to have ended with the 1968-69 term decision
in Benton v. Maryland (applying the Double Jeopardy
Clause to the states). During these nine terms the
Warren Court, using the Fourteenth Amendment as
a lever, made binding upon the states nearly all of
the guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments.
hardly touched these courts' and even where it
did, the consequent changes were of much more
limited scope than were anticipated.
A clear contrast exists between judicial theory
and practice in the lower criminal courts. Ironi-
cally, the contrast appears to be the greatest in
relation to that right which is generally considered
to be the most important to persons accused of a
crime-the right to counsel. 30
For example, Arnold Enker, while addressing
2 The revolution is frequently said to have begun near
the time when the right to counsel was recognized for all
people charged with felonies. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), and ended before the recognition of
that same right for people charged with misdemeanors,
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
"The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the
very existence of a fair trial." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 31 (1972). Mr. Justice Sutherland, in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932), clearly explained
the importance of the right.
The right to be heard would be, in many cases of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science oflaw. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining himself whether the in-
dictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence,
how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
The right to counsel is no less important when counsel's
knowledge and skills are used by the defendant who is
pleading guilty. See D. NEWMAN, CONVI1IION 198
(1966).
The pervading theory is that providing defense counsel
to defendants charged with misdemeanors will balance
(or at least decrease the great imbalance) the power of
the opposing parties in misdemeanor cases and will result
in lower court procedures which more closely approxi-
mate the ideal of the adversary system. Those who share
this view seem to take it for granted that the presence of
defense attorneys and the increased formalization of the
judicial process are inevitably the answer to the lower
court problems. That something is missing in their short-
hand solution is a central focus of the third section of this
article. See notes 55-103 and accompanying text, infra.
For another view that the assumed benefits to be derived
from providing defense counsel in lower courts may not
comport with reality, see, Junker, The Right to Counsel in
Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REi. 685, 697-700
(1968).
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the Viriginia conference, pointed out that "the
primary procedural issue in the lower courts con-
cerns the provision of counsel to those unable to
hire their own attorneys."'3 Presumably, the issue
was resolved three years later when the Supreme
Court ruled in Argersinger v. Hamlin2 that the sixth
amendment right to counsel should be extended to
criminal defendants who risk being sentenced to
jail in the misdemeanor courts.'s It is only partially
correct, however, to say that the constitutional
right to counsel has once again been "extended"
because, in reality, it is more accurate to say that
there has never been an attorney to represent most
defendants who wanted or needed one.3' Neverthe-
s1 Enker, Lower Courts, in C. Whitebread, supra note 7,
at 194. See also L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 89; "As
Justice Walter V. Schaefer of Illinois has said, 'Of all the
rights that an accused person has, the right to be repre-
sented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it
affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have."'
32 4 0 7 U.S. 25 (1972).
a "We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or fe-
lony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."
Id. at 37.
3 4 Cf. W. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMER.
ICAN COURTS 199 (1955):
It seems fair to conclude that at least as many claims
of denial of counsel are never appealed to higher
courts as are, and that an even greater number of
potential claims are never pressed in any court. The
same indigence which resulted in the initial loss of
the right to counsel continues to act as a restraint on
possible corrective action.
M. SCHWARI"., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFES-
SIONAL RFSPONSIBILITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUsTICE 89 (1961):
To state that a defendant has a right to be repre-
sented by counsel may be misleading if the word
"right" is given a Hohfeldian significance-implying
a duty on some persons or institution to furnish
counsel in all cases in which the defendant has the
"right" to be represented by counsel. And even in
those cases where there is such a duty, there remains
the question: on whom does the responsibility to
perform the duty rest?
Beaney, The Right to Counsel in THE RIGHTS OF THE
ACcUSED 147 (S. Nagel ed. 1972):
In an adversary system, the right of all persons faced
with loss of liberty to have the assistance of counsel
seems obvious. Yet, as shown below, the right to
counsel, especially for indigents, is of relatively re-
cent origin, its expansion to various stages of the
criminal justice system has been slow and erratic
and the actual effectiveness of the right in practice
difficult to measure.
Note, Dollars and Sense of An Expanded Right to Counsel, 55
IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1970):
Deprived of the assistance of counsel, the accused
may be totally unaware of the procedural safeguards
less, relatively few writersss have shown any interest
in approaching the problem of the uncounseled
accused from the most useful perspective available:
the trial court experience.
Most writing on the subject of the right to
counsel engages in theorizing about the right with-
out considering the possible discrepancies between
theory and actual practice.36 Therefore, while the
which our system of criminal justice affords. The
defendant's technical ignorance practically assures
that he will not be the most effective advocate of his
case. His dual role as defendant and advocate puts
him in a position from which he will be unlikely to
make an objective analysis of the impact and signif-
icance of the evidence presented against him. He
lacks the legal training which will enable him to
present his evidence completely and in a light most
favorable to himself. Without counsel he will often
be totally incapable of recognizing and effectively
rebutting the evidence raised against him. The result
is to practically ensure his conviction.
L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 93:
Several possible factors may explain why the defend-
ant had no counsel. Except in a few instances, the
county records do not reveal the reason. One possi-
bility is that .a defendant who can afford to retain
counsel may prefer to represent himself ... . The
second factor is that counsel is not available at all.
Id. at 126: "The present survey shows that counsel is not
usually provided to indigent misdemeanor defendants in
the state court systems."
A SPECIAL COMMI-rEE OF THE AssOCIXION OF THE
BAR OF THE CTry OF NEW YORK AND TIHE NATIONAL
LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, EQUAL Jus-
ricE FOR THE AccUSED 42 (1959): "Thus there exists
great diversity in the practice of the several states and in
many states a person can today be convicted of a non-
capital offense in a trial in which, because of lack of
money, he has been forced to defend himself" [hereinafter
cited as EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED].
3 Some exceptions are: S. KRANTiZ, RIGHTrO*0 COUN-
SEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MANDAIE OF ARGERSIN-
GER V. HAMLIN (1976); Ingraham, The Impact of Argersin-
get-One Year Later, 8 LAW & Soc. REV. 615 (1974);
Katz, Municipal Courts-Another Urban Ill, 20 CASE WEST.
ERN L. Rev. 87 (1968); Mileski, Courtroom Encounters: An
Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 LAW & SOC.
REv. 473 (1971); Comment, The Effect of Argersinger v.
Hamlin on the Municipal Court of Toledo, Ohio, 4 U. TOL. L.
REV. 577 (1973).
36 Introduction, SOCIOLOGY ol- LAW 9, 10 (V. Aubert
ed. 1969): "Since the precedents are primarily to be
found in High Court decisions, these judgments consti-
tute the universe from which empirical materials are
drawn, while the actual practices of the lower courts and
of administrsive agencies with semi-judicial functions
are left unmapped." See also Beaney, The Right to Counsel
in THE RIGHTS OFriE ACCUSED 147, 148 (S. Nagel ed.
1972): "Lofty julicial assertions of ,he extensive rights of
an accused are juxtaposed with all-too-easy acceptances
of waiver which minimize or thwart an accused's right in
practice. .. . The landmark decisions tell us something
about judicial attitudes but only hint at actual practices."
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theoretical development of the right is well docu-
mented in the appellate reports, 37 the history of the
right in practice seems hardly to have been ex-
plored at all and probably cannot now be explored
except through an exhaustive study of unevenly
available-and often inaccurate-court records,
supported by a massive oral history project to
reconstruct the everyday functioning of America's
criminal courts.s
The right to bring hired counsel to court is less
important to most criminal defendants than the
right to have counsel provided without cost after a
showing of indigency.39 Yet, neither right exists if
37 See U.S. v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 504 (1976); Herring
v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Ross v. Moffit, 417
U.S. 600 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1970); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1968);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); U.S. v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
3 See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMER-
ICAN COURTS 199 (1955). "Obviously, with present im-
complete data, no one can trace with precision the defects
and accomplishments of American trial courts as they
attempt to conform with the legal rules concerning coun-
sel announced by the highest Court." Id. See also L.
SILVERSIEIN, supra note 20, at 91: "Of the 194 counties
in which docket studies were made, 42 had to be excluded
at the outset because the records were not sufficient to
indicate whether the defendant had counsel or not." See
also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932): "The
record shows that immediately upon the return of the
indictment defendants were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Apparently they were not asked whether they had,
or were able to employ, counsel, or wished to have counsel
appointed . (italics added); Katz, sup'a note 35, at
117:
As a matter of course, no record is kept of the
proceedings in the municipal courts. As a result, very
few cases are appealed-certainly not those involv-
ing unrepresented defendants-and thus there is
little likelihood of landmark appellate decisions af-
fecting these courts, bringing the publicity that is
always attendant upon such decisions.
3 The distinction (though not its significance) is made
clear in the NAIIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERV-
ANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (WICKERSHAM COMMIS-
SION) REPORT ON PROSECUTION 30 (1931):
In America counsel was allowed from an early date
and State and Federal Constitutions guarantee to
accused in all prosecutions "the assistance of counsel
for his defense," in this or some equivalent language.
It will be seen from this bit of history that, as indeed
the courts have held, the right guaranteed is one of
the defendant is unaware of it.' Thus a central
focus of any history of the right to counsel would,
of necessity, involve analysis of the ways in which
criminal defendants know or are informed of their
right to be represented by an attorney. A careful
consideration of this process would also seem to be
the appropriate starting point for any serious at-
tempt to determine whether there is in fact a right
to counsel in the lower courts, or in the criminal
justice system generally. It is somewhat disconcert-
ing to imagine a theoretical analysis which docu-
ments the subtle evolution of a constitutional right
through careful textual interpretation of Supreme
Court decisions, yet which nevertheless manifests
little interest in, or recognition of, a ground-floor4 '
employing counsel, not one of having counsel pro-
vided by the Government.
See also EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, supra note
34, at 40:
The right to the assistance of counsel, as we under-
stand it today, has two elements: the right to retain
counsel; and the right, in certain situations, to have
counsel assigned. The first of these elements is now
so generally accepted that it is considered axiomatic.
Indeed, it is sometimes stated that the right of a
defendant in a criminal case to retain counsel is an
ancient English common-law right. This is not cor-
rect. In common-law systems it is a privilege of
comparatively recent origin which was recognized in
the New World before it was accorded in England.
The privilege came to be accepted as a right even
later.
40 "How can a prisoner 'make an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right' if no one
ever explains to him that he has such a right and what it
means?" L. SILVERsrEIN, supra note 20, at 90.
4i To employ a "ground-floor level" of analysis within
the context of this article is to focus attention upon the
contrasting images one gets of how the judicial system
works depending upon whether one is sitting in the
audience of a noisy misdemeanor courtroom or is reading
a casebook on criminal procedure in a comfortable law
school library. Jerome Frank and the other legal realists
made commonplace the insight that appellate case re-
ports do not tell us all we might like to know about what
determines specific legal outcomes. See J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JusrIcE (1949).
The right to counsel analysis in the text, for example,
reveals that it is impossible to measure the presence or
absence of procedural rights without examining the ex-
perience of the process by those upon whom the system
operates: the defendants themselves. A ground-floor anal-
ysis attempts to secure an account of the lower court
process, not in terms of the process' reflection in ajudge's
legal argument, but rather from the perspective of the
defendant (or at least a faithful courtroom observer,
willing to try to listen and to watch as much as possible
from the defendant's point of view). The law school
casebook, conceived as a model of appropriate informa-
tion about the legal process, obviously omits entirely the
[Vol. 69
PERILS OF PROCEDURE
level of analysis which may well suggest that the
theory takes as its subject a right which does not
exist in reality. 2
Conceptually, the analysis ought to begin with
a separation of the defendant's knowledge of his
rights prior to his contact with the criminal justice
system from that "information" received in the
defendant's experience (and certainly the defendant's
perception of it). Thus a ground-floor level of analysis in
this instance implies a picture of the lower courts in
operation, as seen from the bottom up.
The approach need not, however, be confined in this
way. The phrase itself is borrowed from Fernand Braudel,
the French historian, who views quotidien experience of
the material facts of life-food, climate, work, comfort,
habit-as the ground-floor of history. See F. BRAUDEL,
CAPITALISM AND MA'ERIAL LIFE, 1400-1800 (1973). As
Robert Gordon suggests, see Gordon, infra note 42, the
idea of a ground-floor level of analysis should not be
given the appearance of presenting an ultimately empir-
ical or undeniably hard scientific description of reality.
What is critically different in this approach is the will-
ingness demonstrated by the analyst to enlarge the meth-
odological scope of inquiry beyond the traditional bound-
aries constructed by judges, law professors, and the tra-
ditional legal academic outlets. Stepping off the analytic
elevator at the ground-floor and curiously surveying the
terrain may produce remarkably interesting and un-
known subjects for study. For example, John T. Noonan
recently described the course of his research in the follow-
ing terms: "As I reached what seemed to me the heart of
law's dependence on history, however, I became increas-
ingly conscious of the central place of the human person
in any account of law. I also became increasingly con-
scious of the neglect of the person by legal casebooks,
legal histories, and treatises of jurisprudence." J.
NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF rHE LAW vii (1976).
Gound-floor analyses are "radical" ones: "of or relating
to the root," WE-.BSI'ER'S THIRD NEW INbrERNAIONAL
DICI'IONARY (1961).
42 Disdain for a ground-floor level of analysis also
appears to characterize the theory of contract law. Robert
Gordon suggests that what distinguishes the "Behavioral
Realist" contract law theorists from the dominant "Case
Law" theorists is not that the behaviorists are more
empirical in their research but rather that they define the
scope of their research much more broadly than the case
law contracts professors. "The difference," says Gordon,
"is simply that Behaviorists refuse to limit their universe
of investigation to cases." Thus the dominant theory of
contract law tendis to exclude a ground-floor level of
analysis which might reveal the extent to which busi-
nessmen in practice utilize contract law, replace it, or
even ignore it. The cases which reach litigation (and
ultimately, case books) may not be typical of contractual
relations at all. Arriving at a similar conclusion, Mark
Tushnet points out that "purely legal materials" cannot
show, "as businessmen's records could, the extent to
which people took account of legal rules in their activi-
ties." See Gordon, Book Review 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1216,
1220, 1222-23; Tushnet, Lumber and the Legal Process, 1972
WIs. L. REV. 114, 122.
system, both of which determine his perception of
what his rights are and what rights he should use.
But this is presently impossible. As* important as
the defendant's attitude towards constitutional
rights prior to his entering the courtroom may be
to how he responds to the "information" received
in court, the subject seems to have secured little or
no attention.
An example of how a ground-floor analysis of
the lower courts would shed light on these issues
may be shown by examination of the right to
counsel. Judicial" and professional" standards as
to notice and waiver of right to counsel are clear
enough, yet frequently ignored in the lower crimi-
nal courts. Even when the standards are complied
with, they may fail to secure the defendant's access
to legal representation. Approaching the problem,
not from the perspective of what procedure is most
likely to place an effective waiver of right to counsel
on the record, but rather from how the court can
be assured that an indigent criminal defendant
actually receives the services of an attorney, Lee
Silverstein suggests:
[Iln circumstances where the defendant is entitled
to appointed counsel, he is entitled to have the
appointment offered to him in an effective and
intelligible way. The things that are said, the tone
of voice, the atmosphere of the courtroom or other
place where the offer is made, whether the defend-
ant is given a written explanation of his rights or
told orally, whether by the judge, the prosecutor,
the defender, or a court official; all these matters
and perhaps others affect the defendant's decision
to accept the offer of counsel or to reject it.4
43 The fact that an accused may tell him that he
is informed of his right to counsel and desires to
waive this right does not automatically end the
judge's responsibility. To be valid such waiver must
be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offenses included within them,
the range of allowable punishments thereunder, pos-
sible defenses to the charges and circumstances in
mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a
broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge
can make certain that an accused's professed waiver
of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only
from a penetrating and comprehensive examination
of all the circumstances under which such a plea is
tendered.
Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948). See also
United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (1964).
44 See ABA PROJEg' ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAl.JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAIAING TO PROVID-
ING DEFENSE SERVICES 11-12 (1967). ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LAING TO THE FUNGrION OF THE Tp.IAL JUDGE 84-85
(1966).
4 L. SILVERSI'EIN, supra note 20, at 89.
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A variety of barriers may stand between the
defendant and his sixth amendment right to coun-
sel. The defendant may be unaware of his right
simply because he was not informed of the right
by the judge.40 Or, in a court where the judge's
introductory remarks are expected to serve as a
mass notification 47 of the various rights available
to defendants with cases scheduled that day,4 a
defendant may fail to be informed of his right to
counsel simply because he is tardy in arriving at
the courtroom or because he is still detained'in the
lock-up. Even when the defendant is present to hear
his rights read, he may not necessarily understand
them because (1) rights are read in English to those
who do not understand English, (2) rights are read
in English to those who do not know how to
translate "legally relevant phrases," (3) the accused
is still under the influence of alcohol or drugs if he
"n See Mileski, supra note 35, at 484: "In a quarter
(26%) of the lower court cases, the judge does not apprise
the defendant of his constitutional rights at all." Though
Mileski's observation of the lower criminal courts pre-
ceded the Argersinger decision, an Ohio municipal court
monitoring project conducted by Krantz, supra note 35,
at 410-11 subsequent to Argersinger revealed even more
startling results:
Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure require that any
waiver of the right to counsel must be recorded,
along with the court's advice on the defendant's
right to have counsel represent him. Often there is
no advice of the court to be recorded. The director
of the Cleveland Legal Aid Society says that there
are very few good waivers in the Municipal Court.
He estimates that probably one-third of the munic-
ipal court judges make a serious effort to inform
defendants of their rights, one-third make half-
hearted efforts, and another third tell the defendant
absolutely nothing about right to counsel.
17 Mass notification has been approved for testing the
voluntariness of misdemeanor guilty pleas. See In re
Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1965); Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515
P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1973); City of Cleveland v.
Whipkey. 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 278 N.E.2d 374 (1972);
Crew v. Nelson, 216 N.W.2d 565 (S.D. 1974).
48 tf a defendant happens to be talking to his neigh-
bor, if he is for some other reason inattentive, or if
he arrives in court later than the scheduled ten
o'clock, he is not formally informed of his rights
unless the judge later informs him in a face-to-face
encounter as he sometimes does. Inattention or tar-
diness, then, may carry with it whatever are the
consequences of ignorance of constitutional rights.
Mileski, supra note 35, at 482. See also S. KRAN'Z, supra
note 35, at 112, where he states:
Mass notice of a right to counsel cannot be effective
for several reasons. First, a defendant may not even
be present, if the notice is read-as was the case in
the Belle Glade Municipal Court and the Birming-
ham Recorder's Court-at the start of the session by
the judge or a court clerk.
is arraigned shortly after arrest, or (4) due process
protections are defeated by the confusion and dis-
order of lower court operation or by the indiffer-
ence of court personnel.49
49 For example, the following excerpts testify to the
pervasiveness of these problems.
Those whose English is deficient are similarly at risk
in making statements to the police or the courts.
Until the ending of mass immigration into America
after the First World War, there were a number of
cases of Hungarian, Polish, Irish, Croat, Norweg;an
and other immigrants speaking little or no English
being wrongly imprisoned partly because of misun-
derstandings or mistranslations during or before the
trial. Today the chief problem lies with the Spanish-
speaking Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.
R. BRANIXN & C. DAVIES, WRONGFUL. IMPRISONMENT
231 (1973).
In one case, the colloquy consisted of a single ques-
tion by the judge, "Do you have any money?" and
an answer, "Yes." Another defendant was asked how
much money he had in his pocket. He replied, "forty
cents." The judge, presumably in jest, told the de-
fendant he "should hire a forty-cent lawyer." Miss-
ing thejoke, the Spanish-speaking accused was tried
and convicted without a lawyer.
Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond
12 AMER. CRIM. L. REv. 601, 621 (1975).
The second judge simply reads a notice of rights to
all the defendants assembled in the courtroom. He
reads the text at a speed and in a tone that makes it
difficult to comprehend; his language is also proba-
bly beyond the comprehension of many of the de-
fendants. In addition, the notice read states that a
defendant should "bring to the court's attention"
the fact of his indigency or desire for counsel, without
specifying the time or manner appropriate for such
a communication to the court. For most defendants,
therefore, failure to request counsel is taken as an
implicit waiver of the right.
S. KRAN-iz, supra note 35, at 381.
Perhaps nothing so perfectly characterizes the defend-
ant's understanding of lower criminal court procedure
than this partial colloquy cited in S. KRAN'tIZ, supra note
35, at 410:
J: Do you have an attorney?
D: No.
J: You are charged with , a misdeameanor.
You may plead guilty, not guilty, no contest, or you
may have a continuance to find an attorney.
D: (Silence)...
"At least one Wisconsin judge asks the defendant,
'What do I mean when I say right to counsel?' He
indicates that he often receives an answer which per-
suades him that the defendant does not really understand
what is involved." Remington, Defense of the Indigent in
Wisconsin, 37 Wis. BAR Bui.i.. 40, 46 (1964).
There was always the unmistakable impression that
many of these people did not even hear the instruc-
tions, much less understand them. When the instruc-
tions were completed, the defendants were herded
out of the courtroom to wait until their individual
cases were called.
Even if the instructions were heard, can under-
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When the defendant is informed of his right to
counsel while standing before the judge among a
large group of prisoners, he is less likely to ask
questions of any kind than if he is individually
notified of his rights.s° Frequently, defendants who
standing be presumed? Although the instrdictions
given may seem simple enough to somone with legal
training, many of the people to whom they were
directed may have had little formal education. They
could not b'e expected to know the degree of impor-
tance attached to the right of counsel by'tlie Su-
preme Court. At the time the instructions. were
given, some of the defendants may not hive known
the offense they were charged with, whether the
offense was a felony or misdemeanor, or if the offense
could be penalized by days in jail. Another factor
contributing to the uncertainty of understanding
must be the very real psychological pressures that
prey on those accused of crime, especially if im-
mersed in the bewildering criminal process for the
first time.
Comment, The Effect of Argersinger, supra note 35, at 582.
He [the indigent defendant] may not appreciate the
advantages of having a lawyer, especially if it is his
first experience in court. Indeed, he may not even
understand that the word "counsel" means lawyer.
From one Midwestern state came the report that
certain defendants formerly thought "counsel"
meant some sort of adviser like a family counselor.
And the reporter from Idaho told of a prisoner who
had waived "counsel" because he did not know that
the word means lawyer. Some defendants are con-
fused, even bewildered, when they are brought be-
fore a court, and are in no position to make a rational
decision about whether they want counsel.
L. SILVERSrEIN, supra note 20, at 90.
50 "[M]ass warnings do little to dispel the possibilities
for intimidation inherent in a busy nonfelony court ....
Even the state courts that have condoned the practice of
a mass warning recognize that the.better procedure is to
individualize the notice of right to counsel." S. KRANIZ,
supra note 35, at 112.
Only half (5 1%) the defendants see the judge indi-
--- vidually. Thus only half the defendants in the lower
court engage in what fits the popular and even
academic image of the judge-defendant confronta-
tion. The remainder of the defendants see the judge
only in conjunction with others. Sometimes the
group is large; 15% of "ie total defendants face the
judge with ten or more others alongside them. Most
criminal defendants presumably commit their of-
fenses alone and go on to receive their sanctions in
the midst of strangers. Decisions as to dispositions
may historically have become more individualized,
but numerous encounters in contemporary lower
courts are not.
Mileski, supra note 35, at 480.
See also Nutter, The Quality of Justice in Misdemeanor
Arraignment Courts, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 215, 216
(1962), where it is reported that: "In Divisions 50, 58,
and 59 [of the Los Angeles municipal arraignment courts]
defendants are informed of their constitutional rights in
crowds ranging in size from 100 to 300 defendants."
are informed of their right to counsel are provided
with such partial explanations of what that right
entails that counsel is effectively denied. 5'
*Thus an ensemble of banal, everyday legal de-
vices can circumvent the essential constitutional
right to counsel, as recognized in the Argersinger
decision. Such practices may reflect less of a coor-
dinated strategy to thwart a Supreme Court ruling
than a primary commitment to the reproduction
of the judicial system as a bureaucratic structure.
As Maureen Mileski points out:
[Ilt is work and time for the court to apprise indi-
vidual defendants of their rights. If there are to be
apprisings at all, it is most expedient, from a bu-
reaucratic point of view, to apprise as many defend-
ants as quickly as possible in a situation where
questions are not likely to be asked. Moreover, if a
defendant understands and asserts his rights, it can
be to the detriment of court efficiency s 2
"' The method of advising defendants of their
right to counsel is somewhat different in the Harris
County (Houston, Texas) Criminal Court. Appoint-
ment of counkel is not undertaken until the hearing
of the jail docket.... No attempt is made to explain
that there may be a difference in consequences if an
attorney is appointed. Moreover, although defend-
ants are informed that lawyers may be obtained, it
is not made clear that the fee is paid by the county.
S. KRAN i-/, supra note 35, at 110.
In summary, although most defendants are advised
of their right to counsel at some point in their
interaction with the criminal justice system, it is
infrequent that they are told of the consequences of
this decision. In none of the observed cities was the
defendant informed that, according to Argersinger,
the absence of a lawyer without waiving the right to
counsel precluded the possibility of his incarceration.
Id. at 111.
"[A]n accused person uninformed bf his right to free
counsel may be quite as imposed upon as one informed
of a right he cannot exercise because of poverty." Ellison,
Assigned Counsel in Montana: The Law and the Practice, 26
MoN-r. L. REV. 1, 2 (1969).
Of the three judges observed, Judge A's approach to
providing counsel for indigents was at once the
simplest and also the most unconstitutional....
Judge A typically explained: "You have a right of
counsel." He did not say that they would be pro-
vided counsel if unable to hire their own. No instruc-
tion was given that they could not be sent to jail
unless they had been represented by counsel or had
waived that right. .. . The result of these instructions
would leave the average person with the understand-
ing that he could be represented in court if he were
able to employ his own lawyer. The question of a
waiver of the right to appointed counsel never arose
in Judge A's court because the accused were never
informed that the right existed.
Comment, The Effect of Argersinger, supra note 35, at 579.
52 Mileski, supra note 35, at 484.
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If subsequent to the Argersinger decision, a ma-
jority of misdemeanor defendants still appear in
the criminal courts wtihout the assistance of coun-
sel and waiver rates remain high, "3 it may well be
that though the Supreme Court has changed our
understanding of who has a right to counsel in the
criminal courts, the lower courts have not changed
their routinized patterns of informing defendants
of what rights (at least in theory) are available to
them. "There is considerable evidence," Silverstein
indicates, "of a cause-and-effect relation between
the method a court uses to offer counsel and the
proportion of defendants who waive counsel. ' ' 4
Procedural due process in practice falls far short
of what is promised by the theoretical analyses of
fairness and justice which characterize appellate
reports. The right to counsel is just one-though
perhaps the most critical-example of this discrep-
ancy, and the limited analytical focus employed
thus far to examine trial court operation may have
brought into view no more than the tip of the
iceberg of massive contrast between theory and
practice in misdemeanor adjudication. Certainly
there can be no full understanding of how these
"3 S. KRAN'FZ, supra note 35, at 4-5:
Although most jurisdictions have begun to appoint
counsel in nonfelony cases where imprisonment may
be imposed (some jurisdictions, in fact, had done so
even before Argersinger), compliance has generally
been taken in nature. What this means is that: (a)
waiver of counsel remains common and is often
openly encouraged by judges ....
Id. at 365:
Approximately one in five of the total defendants
was accompanied by counsel at trial. The degree of
representation was higher in Period III than it was
in either of the other two periods. The presence of
counsel made a large difference in all three periods
on whether or not a defendant was found guilty.
... The differences in the percentage of defendants
found guilty with and without counsel in the three
periods are 23 per cent, 18.8 per cent, and 22.1 per
cent, respectively. Thus, counsel was not only de-
monstrably important but as well affected the num-
ber of accuseds who actually could be jailed.
Ingraham, supra note 35, at 634:
No substantial increase in the number of not guilty
pleas entered to misdemeanor charges has resulted
in the majority of jurisdictions polled. This may
reflect the fact that misdemeanants are continuing
in the great majority of cases to plead guilty to the
charges placed against them even with counsel or
that they are pleading guilty and signing waivers of
counsel; or it may indicate that the courts are com-
pensating for Argersinger by reducing the number
and kinds of cases in which they impose jail terms so
as to avoid the necessity of appointing counsel and
reduce the possibility of not guilty pleas being made.
5 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 102.
courts presently function, and therefore of how to
make them workjustly and fairly, without a clearer
focus being given to the actual everyday operation
of the lower criminal court system.
ADVERSE MODELS
Setting to one side the contradiction between the
Argersinger vision and the continuing lack of access
to counsel by criminal defendants in the lower
court and reserving for other writers a further
investigation of the constellation of problems re-
volving around the difference between the presence
of defense attorneys in the court and a genuinely
adversary proceedingas it can be stated that, con-
ceptually, the Argersinger decision represents the
proposition that essential reform of lower criminal
court procedure can be achieved through massive
injections of defense counsel. Such an injection can
make operational the due process protections which
are in this mainstream of criminal justice and thus
make the adversary system a reality. This is not the
only approach to reform of the lower criminal
courts and, indeed, those committed to finding
solutions to the chronic problems of the lower
criminal courts may well be moving strategically
in opposite directions.
Herbert Packer's model of the criminal process5
provides, at least initially, a convenient framework
for considering the possible ways in which lower
criminal court procedure can be altered. Packer
presents two divergent models of criminal justice:
a Crime Control Model and a Due Process Model.
These represent the extreme polar delimitation of
a spectrum along which, at some point, a balance
is inevitably struck embodying an at least tempo-
rary reconciliation of conflicting procedural theo-
ries behind which stand entire systems of social
values. The inquiry which Packer constructs
around the antinomic relationship between his
models has had a considerable impact upon general
understanding of the criminal process.5 7 Other
5 Cf Alschuller, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining,
36 U. CI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Blumberg, The Practice of
Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a
Profession, 1 LAW & Soc. REV. 15 (1967); Skolnick, Social
Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICr REsoI.u.
riON 52 (1967).
so Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (1964) and H. PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).57 G. COLE, POLrrICS AND THe ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 53 (1973): "In what is regarded as one of the
most important recent contributions to systematic
thought about the administration of criminal justice,
Herbert Packer has articulated the values supporting two
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model-builders have helped illustrate the opposi-
tion between a conception of criminal procedure
which emphasizes crime control, public order, ju-
dicial bargaining and compromise at the expense
of adversary process as against one which seeks to
protect individual rights, the presumption of in-
nocence, a combative trial procedure and civil
liberties generally, maximized at whatever cost. 58
models of the justice process. ... "and Griffiths, Ideology
in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1970). Packer's article is
widely regarded as the most important recent contribu-
tion to systematic thought about criminal procedure.
5 G. COLE, supra note 51, at 55:
The "due process model," often referred to as the
"combat or adversary model," is the image generally
held by the public of the judicial system. This view
stresses both the adversary nature of courtroom pro-
ceedings and the rights of the individual as the truth
is discovered. ... Although it does not deny the
social desirability of repressing crime, it stresses the
problems of errors committed during the fact-finding
stages. Because of the value placed upon the individ-
ual's freedom, the deprivation of which could result
from the judicial process, every effort is made to
protect the accused from the consequences of errors
in the system. Hence, the model assumes that a
person is innocent until proved guilty, that he has
an opportunity to discredit the case brought against
him, and that an impartial judge is provided to
decide the outcome. ... Compared with the "due
process model," the "criminal control model" de-
emphasizes the adversary nature of the judicial sys-
tem. Rather than stressing the combative elements
of the courtroom, this model notes that bargaining
between the state and the accused occurs at several
points. The ritual of the courtroom is enacted in
only a small number of cases; the rest are disposed
of through negotiations over the charges, usually
ending with defendants' pleas of guilty.
A. SMITH & H. POLLACK, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN A
MASS SocIErY 157 (1972):
It is obvious that the reality of our judicial process
conforms far more closely to the bureaucratic model
than to the adversary ideal. Criminal defendants are
adjudicated, not by a trial involving two equally
matched lawyer-champions arguing before a neutral
judge and jury, but by private negotiations between
actors who have at least as much claim on each
other as the defendant has on any one of them. The
judicial process, in short, is one of bargaining and
compromise; it is informal, and indeed exists only
through its ability to short-circuit and bypass the
prescribed, formal procedures.
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1964):
The Crime Control Model tends to deemphasize this
adversary aspect of the process; the Due Process
Model tends to make it central.... The value system
that underlies the Crime Control Model is based on
the proposition that the repression of criminal con-
duct is by far the most important function to be
"If the Crime Control Model resembles an assem-
bly line," Packer suggests, "the Due Process Model
looks very much like an obstacle course.
59
It is not surprising, therefore, that many of those
who have argued that the lower criminal courts
offer no more than "assembly line" justice, have
posed an alternative which places the procedural
balance dramatically closer to the Due Process pole
of Packer's spectrum.W° Again, this is the focus of
performed by the criminal process. The failure of
law enforcement to bring criminal conduct under
tight control is viewed as leading to the breakdown
of public order and thence to the disappearance of
an important condition of human freedom.
Though Packer outlined his conflicting models of crim-
inal procedure in 1964, the basic tension between them
was characterized as the central dilemma confronting
any system of criminal procedure by Jerome Hall in a
1942 Yale Law Journal article, reprinted in J. HALL,
S'rUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAl. THEORY
220, 221 (1958):
None of the above sources, forms or standards of
criticism has any relevance or utility apart from the
ultimate ends of criminal procedure-to convict the
guilty and acquit the innocent. Only in the light of
this distinctive dual objective of criminal procedure
can any intelligent judgment be made as to the
logical, scientific, ethical or efficient quality of any
method, proposal or reform. Hence the most impor-
tant single generalization that can be made about
American criminal procedure or for that matter
about any civilized procedure is that its ultimate
ends are dual and conflicting. It must be designed
from inception to end, to acquit the innocent as
readily, at least, as to convict the guilty. ... The
dilemma consists in the fact that the easier it is made
to prove guilt, the more difficult does it become to
establish innocence.... The presumption that to be
charged means to be guilty has been tenaciously, if
unconsciously, entertained by well-intentioned re-
formers lulled into complacency by humanitarian
motives to substitute "treatment" for punishment,
and enlightened by negligible insight into the func-
tions of criminal procedure. It can be demonstrated
that their agitation parallels Enrico Ferri's almost to
the word; one has but to read his condemnation of
any presumption of innocence and of civil liberties
enerally to know where such reform leads.
Packer, supra note 56, at 13.
60 See Oliphant, supra note 2, at 547-48:
Argersinger v. Hamlin openly invites an effective
two-pronged attack on the injustice that exists in the
lower courts. The opportunity exists for law schools
throughout the nation to marshal the ability, enthu-
siasm and vigor of their students in the defense of
misdemeanants, while similtaneously educating
these prospective members of the bar in the actuality
of ethical lawyering. The fashion in which this in-
vitation, albeit challenge, is met will be critical to
the improvement of the criminal justice system. If
law students, law schools, and law teachers fail to
seize the opportunity for education, service and re-
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the Argersinger approach.6t
However, in an important critique of the ana-
lytical framework which Packer employs, John
Griffiths argues62 that the two models outlined by
Packer can readily be collapsed into a single model,
a "Battle Model" of criminal procedure and that
options obfuscated by Packer's oversimplification
should, in fact, be central to any serious consider-
ation of reforming American criminal justice. As
Griffiths states, "Packer consistently portrays the
criminal process as a struggle-a stylized
war-between two contending forces whose inter-
ests are implacably hostile: the Individual (partic-
ularly the accused inJividual) and the State. His
two Models are nothing more than alternative
derivations from that conception of profound and
irreconcilable disharmony of inter'est. ' ' 6a The
Crime Control Model, therefore, tends to promote
rules of procedure which make it easier for the state
to secure a conviction whereas the Due Process
Model seeks, in effect, tournament regulations
which make it as difficult as possible for the state
to put a suspected criminal in jail.' However, both
of Packer's models miss the point. Within the Battle
Model, defense counsel is neither concerned with
form provided by the Supreme Court in Argersinger,
little hope would remain that confidence in the
lower court system could ever be restored. There
would be even dimmer hope that the badly needed,
massive overhaul of the lower court system would
ever by effectively accomplished.
See also S. KRAN'[-Z, supra note 35, at 4:
To millions of people, most of them poor, nonfelony
courts appear to-and often do-dispense justice in
an assembly-line basis, with little regard for the basic
rights of individual.... Although the mere addition
of appointed lawyers for eligible defendants will not
alone reverse a century of neglect, the opinion has
nonetheless been heralded by many as a significant
advance in ensuring greater fairness for the poor. It
is with this background in mind that Argersinger must
be examined.
See also Bazelon, Forward to S. KRAN'IZ, id., at xxvii.
61 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972):
There is evidence of the prejudice which results to
misdemeanor defendants from this "assembly-line
justice." One study concluded that "'[mlisdemean-
ants represented by attorneys are five times as likely
to emerge from police courts with all the charges
dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges
without counsel."... We must conclude, therefore,
that the problems associated with misdemeanor and
petty offenses often require the presence of counsel
to insure the accused a fair trial.
2 Griffiths, supra note 57.
6 3d. at 367.
6 Id. at 363.
whether the accused is factually guilty,s nor is he
concerned with any interest of the accused beyond
that defined by the process-to win his case, to
avoid exile." Also, defense counsel is certainly not
concerned with the accused as a person,6 7 who is
inevitably sent by the criminal justice system either
to prison or back into the environment that gen-
erated the criminal behavior.
These issues do not even arise within the para-
digm which Packer presents, and thus Griffiths is
led to conclude that "the intellectual apparatus
Packer presented with such revealingly extrava-
gant claims is in fact a clear, if unself-conscious,
articulation of the ideology which is responsible for
the characteristic limitations of most contemporary
thinking about the criminal process."68 The pri-
mary value of Griffiths' inquiry into the scope of
Packer's spectrum thus becomes one of demystifi-
cation,6 a cogent demonstration of the implicit
ideological assumptions of Packer that animate a
great deal of the contemporary debate about re-
form of the criminal process. Griffiths seems to
sense, however, that it is not enough to discover the
omissions in Packer's theory. Rather, he notes that
the Crime Control/Due Process dichotomy must
be confronted with an alternative theory of avail-
able procedural options.
The first thing to be said about Griffiths' alter-
native is that it has a great deal in common with
the one propdsed by Karl Llewellyn 70 and that it
inevitably suffers from similar weaknesses. Griffiths
contrasts Packer's Battle Model with his own
"Family Model," 7 1 and Llewellyn opposed the
6 For an explanation of the difference between
"factual" and "legal" guilt, see Barkai, Accuracy In-
quiries For All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary
Pleas But Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. R-v. 88
(1977).
Griffiths, supra note 57, at 383.
6 Id. at 384: "An analogous change in our attitude
toward criminal defendants would bring with it a
thoroughgoing respect for their rights and their dig-
nity and their individuality, going far beyond the
purely formal respect which now attaches to the
defendant in his role as party to a tournament."
68 Id. at 410.
"sJ. ROBFRt-SON, supra note 14, at 345-46: "John
Griffiths' critique of the adversary or 'battle' model,
to use his term, shows the conceptual and practical
limitations that flow from a narrow conception of
the criminal process.... As an exercise in demvsti-
fication. his article is essential to an understanding
of the criminal process."
70 Griffiths. supra note 57, at 372.
71 See K. LI.E \WEI.I.YN, The Anthropology qf Criminal Guilt,
in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRAC-
"rcr. 439 (1962). The commonality of the non-adversarial
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"arm's-length" model with what he calls a "paren-
tal" model, but the distinction being made is the
same.
72 Griffiths is drawn to a Family Model of
criminal procedure because the name "invokes a
'real world' institution which occasionally inflicts
punishments on offenders for their offenses but
which is nonetheless built upon a fundamental
assumption of harmony of interest and love... ",3
Llewellyn extrapolates his parental model from the
practice of the Cheyenne and New Mexican Pueb-
los74 but in the end calls it a "parental" model
because it corresponds in rough outline to the
system "by which we make and administer the
criminal law of and within the household, the
school, the system under which we grow up."
7 5
The implied analogy between the family and its
internal politics and the criminal justice system as
a basis for the alternative model is unfortunate.
One commentator criticizes the analogy on the
grounds that "if Professor Griffiths had set out to
show that the 'Family Model' is a prototype of
warfare he would have had an easier time of it-he
would have had extensive aid from psychoanaly-
sis."76 But more fundamentally, the family as an
forms of procedure described by Griffiths and Llewellyn
has been previously noted in Damaska, Evidentiar, Barriers
to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Com-
parative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506 (1973), and Da-
maska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Pro-
cedure, 84 YALE L. J. 480 (1975).
7 K. LLEWELL.YN, supra note 71, at 447.
7' Griffiths, supra note 57, at 372.
74 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 71, at 447 and K. L.rw-
EI.I.YN, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941).
75 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 71, at 448.
76 Cowan, Law Without Force, 59 CALIF. L. RE.V. 683.
693 n.14 (1971):
I welcome the idea of thought constructs that are
alternative to the model of the criminal sanction as
war. But the. notion of using the human family as a
methodological root metaphor in opposition to a
"Battle Model" is disturbing to me. I am at a loss to
understand how the manner in which the members
of the human family treat one another is, overall,
any better than society's current treatment of the
criminal. If Professor Griffiths had set out to show
that the "Family Model" is a prototype of warfare
he would have had an easier time of it-he would
have had extensive aid from psychoanalysis. He
must be aware that the especially heinous crimes are
family based and that the family's most atrocious
outrages are not even recognized as crimes at all. He
must also know that the progress of the human
family is toward disintegration to its biological nu-
cleus not the other way about: and that family law
is, if anything, in a worse state of confusion than
even the criminal law. I wish he had chosen almost
institution is already effectively integrated into the
reproduction of modern society, including the pres-
ent system of rules and their enforcement. 7 The
family then is hardly an innocent institution and,
despite Griffiths' disclaimer, provides an inade-
quate basis even for an altogether abstracted and
metaphorical example of an essentially different
regime of criminal process.'8
The major problem, however, with the Grif-
fiths/Llewellyn alternative is the failure to perceive
the necessity of relating closely their speculation
about the potential for "reconcilable-even mu-
tually supportive-interests, a state of love," 79 and
"this feeling of We-ness, of love, acceptability, ac-
ceptance, and welcome. . . "' to the "objective life
of the particular society. " What is needed is a
clear demonstration of the relationship between
those structures of feeling appropriate to non-war-
like systems of criminal adjudication82 and the
any other idea or institution as a heuristic instead of
the most contentious one of all.
" American historian Christopher Lasch argues that
the family is the most important agency of socialization
since it not only teaches the child his first lessons in the
character of formal social rules but also instills habitual
modes of thought and feeling which will later form the
individual's unconscious predisposition to act in certain
ways in relation to all authority. It is this dual role which
effectively implicates the family in the reproduction of
social and legal codes of behavior. See Lasch. 7he Family
and Histog, THE NEw YORK R-vi-;W 13 November 33
(1975).
78 Griffiths, supra note 57, at 372 indicates that "I wish
to emphasize, however, that this allusive reference is to
our family ideology as I take it to be, not to the facts of all
or particular families." Presumably the purpose of this
emphasis is merely to protect his conception of a Family
Model of criminal process from contradiction by the life
experience of a handful of families. If Griffiths is suggest-
ing that the family ideology he perceives has no relation
to ihe general situation of the family in society, then his
model would no longer even invoke a "real world" insti-
tution and Griffiths' discussion would then be even more
obviously disconnected from any specific social institu-
tion.
'9 Griffiths, supra note 57, at 371.
80 K. Li.FWEi-.tYN. supra note 71, at 448.
8 1 See L. GOLDMANN, THE PHIIOSOPHY OF i1'1-. EN.
LIGH'FNMtENr15 (1973): "We have long since learned
from the social history of ideas that every mode of human
thought and feeling is determined by mental structures
which are closely related to the objective life of the
particular society in which they develop."82 An excellent description of the sort of shared belief
system essential to the operation of a non-adversarial
criminal procedure, which manages to maintain its legit-
imacy even when an accused felon is being tried, is
provided by K. LLEWI.I.YN & K. HosEl.. in THE CHEY-
ENNE WAY 132-33 (1941):
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objective character of social interests and conflicts
within societies where the Battle Model has been
or would be effectively discarded. Jesse Berman's
first-hand account of lower criminal court proce-
dure in Cubas provides a useful step in the right
direction. While Berman examines the stated pur-
poses and functions of the "popular tribunals,"
' 4
The homicide record of the Cheyennes-sixteen re-
corded killings within the tribe in two generations
(1835-1879), or an annual rate of almost one killing
to a theoretical ten thousand of population-is an-
other evidence of the conflict between the aggressive
personal ego of the individual male and the patterns
of restraint which were also ideationally promul-
gated by the culture.
The killing of one Cheyenne by another Cheyenne
was a sin which bloodied the Sacred Arrows, endan-
gering thereby the well-being of the people. As such
it was treated as a crime against the nation ...
Much of the crystallization of Cheyenne community
consciousness into political reality was due to the
action of this social catalytic . . . When murder had
been done, a pall fell over the Cheyenne tribe. There
could be no success in war; there would be no
bountifulness in available food. "Game shunned the
territory; it made the tribe lonesome." So pro-
nounced Spotted Elk; so assent all Cheyennes.
83 Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 1317 (1969).
84 Berman introduces his discussion of Cuban lower
court criminal justice by quoting a statement made in
1953 by a well-known Cuban lawyer (Fidel Castro) on
one of Roscoe Pound's favorite subjects (see, e.g., S.
GLUECK, ROSCOE POUND AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
30-36 (1965)), the individualization of the criminal proc-
ess:
When you judge a defendant for robbery, your
honors, do you ask him how long he has been
unemployed? Do you ask him how many children
he has, which days of the week he ate and which he
didn't, do you concern yourself with his environment
at all? You send him to jail without further thought.
F CASTRO, HISTORY WILL ABSOLVE ME (1967), quoted
in Berman, supra note 83, at 1317.
Bias Roca, Chairman of the Commission for Consti-
tutional Studies of the Central Committee of the Cuban
Communist Party, provides a description of the lower
courts with which Berman compares his own observations
of the system in practice.
The fact that the Popular tribunals are organized
and function in the neighborhood, so that neighbors
and acquaintances of those being judged can attend
the trials and can make these trials truly public, and
that the judges sitting in these trials come from the
same community in which they live and work, rein-
forces the idea that the justice they administer is
that of the working people, the expression of the
power of the working people in the socialist state
... to edify and consolidate the new society of so-
cialism and communism, to educate the new man,
to secure and to perfect the rules of the socialist
community.
the key participants in court operations,8s and the
variety of typical misdemeanor cases, 86 his com-
Berman, supra note 83, at 1318. Other useful accounts of
how the Cuban legal system works are: H. BLUMTSIEIN,
et al., AREA HANDBe)OK FOR CUBA, DA PAM 417-30,
550-52 (1971); C. MESA-LAGO, CUBA IN THE 1970's:
PRAGMATISM AND INSTITUIIONAI.IZArION 68-73
(1974); J. YGLESIAS, IN THE FiST OF "I'HE REVOLUr'ION:
LIFE IN A CUBAN COUNTRY TOWN (1968). See also the
most important legal article since Berman's analysis,
Kennedy, Cuba's Ley Contra La Vagancia-The Law on
Loafing, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1177 (1973).
It is worthwhile to compare Cuba's popular tribunals
with the neighborhood courts experiment in Chile prior
to the overthrow of the Allende government. Jose Antonio
Viera-Gallo, then Subsecretary of the Chilean Ministry
of Justice, stated in a speech in 1972 that:
The state must guarantee to the people not only
access to justice, but also participation in the exer-
cises ofjudicial power. Learning from experiences of
many countries, we want the people to participate
in numerous ways in the administration of justice.
Perhaps we differ as to the form of this participation,
but we start from a common assumption-the self-
discipline of the people in matters ofjustice. Several
months ago we introduced a bill in the congress
through which these ideals would be made concrete
by the creation of neighborhood courts (Tribunales
vecinales). Numerous jurists and magistrates, with
diverse political ideologies, participated in its draft-
ing. The bill was based partially on the phenomenon
of popular justice or informal conflict resolution,
which has been growing spontaneously and totally
unregulated throughout Chile and which resolves
problems of incandescent interest to the people.
Popular justice is now common in land reform set-
tlements, rural cooperatives, neighborhood councils,
and other community groups. The Government does
not want to remain indifferent to the demand of the
people, and hence, the bill creating tribunales vecinales
collected together and consolidated all these experi-
ences.
Viera-Gallo, The Legal System and Socialism, 1972 Wis. L.
REv. 754, 765. See also Mesch, supra note 5; Platt, The
Clinical Legal Assistance Program: A Chilean Experience in
COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INI'ERNA'I'IONAL LEGAL CEN-
TER, SELECTIED READINGS IN CLINICAL EDUCAI'ION
(1973).
s These include the lay judges, the Asesores (who train
the popular judges and also perform appellate functions
within the court system), the Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution (which are neighborhood organizations
that function as intelligence gatherers for the judicial
system and occasionally bring accusations in court), the
police and the spectators. Berman, supra note 83, at
1334-43.
86 A woman claimed that her neighbor (a soldier) took
more than his share of water from a common source; a
wife claimed that her husband had struck her in the face;
a husband knifed his wife; a wife claimed that her
husband had publicly accused her of having affairs with
other men; a family was charged with having altered the
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ments on the selection and training of lower court
judges are particularly revealing.
The Popular Tribunal judges are laymen. Aside
from a three-week training course, their only legal
experience is that which they gain while serving as
Popular Tribunal judges .... Perhaps it is not
unfair to say that it is deemed more important that
the people know the judges than that the judges
know the law. The judges do indeed come from the
community; they are among the four or five thou-
sand residents of the zona over which their Tribunal
has jurisdiction. They are workers, employed in
various, full-time jobs during the day, and they
serve in the Popular Tribunals, which meet at night,
without pay. Their working class background is
genuine. In the Luyano section, in Havana, for
example, the judges also do all the plumbing and
cleaning in the courtrooms .... While Cuba cannot
yet be termed a classless society, the Popular Tri-
bunal judges of any given zona appear to be rela-
tively indistinguishable from the acusados, from the
audience, or from the people of that zona in gen-
eral.87
There certainly seems to be evident, in the Cu-
ban lower courts, a fundamental harmony of inter-
ests, which provides the basis for Griffiths' alter-
native to the Battle Model of criminal procedure.88
When Griffiths argues that the courts have impor-
tant educational functions to perform in relation
to the popular conception of social responsibility,8 9
clothing pages of their ration booklets; a retired baker
was accused of having sold bread on the black market; a
young man was alleged to be a peeping Tom. Berman,
supra note 83, at 1323-24.
8 Berman, supra hote 83, at 1335.
88 Berman, supra note 83, at 1318:
More practically speaking, the purpose of the Pop-
ular Tribunals is to encourage acceptance of the
laws of a new society by making the courts, which
enforce these new laws, not institutions of coercion,
but familiar, popularly accepted institutions. If the
people can identify with the courts, they can identify
with the law they learn in those courts, and can
learn to avoid voluntarily what these courts term
"anti-social conduct."
" Griffiths, supra note 57, at 389-90:
One particularly important substantive function
with reference to which any institution can be de-
signed is its educational impact upon those exposed
to it. Children, defendants, and everyone else, learn
both from the objective of a process they participate
in and from the nature of the process. Robert Dreeben
has recently written about the pedagogical effects of
the structure of a schooling environment, as distin-
guished from the effects of the instructional content
of the school curriculum (taken broadly to include
such things as "citizenship" which are self-con-
he echoes one of the central propositions of the
Cuban theory: that the judicial process itself is a
form of political culture.?
°
The contrast between Berman's description of
Cuba's popular tribunals in action and the reality
of American municipal court justice could not be
more striking. Lewis Katz reports that:
Apparent during almost every visit to an urban
court was the fact that most of the defendants are
poor and black .... The black defendant faces an
almost exclusively white establishment seemingly
unconcerned with his problems. This attitude rep
resents the inability of successful persons to under-
stand the least successful members of the commu-
nity and the problems which have brought them
before these courts.9 1
However, if we are interested in evaluating the
"workability" of non-warlike models of criminal
procedure in American courts,92 we would need to
sciously "taught"). His thesis, with "defendant" sub-
stituted for "pupil" and "the criminal process" for
"teachers" (this should really be by "schools"), is
precisely what is central to the Family Model con-
ception of the relation of process to substantive
functions in criminal procedure.
90 Berman, supra note 83, at 1342-43:
These ideas may be capsulized as popular involve-
ment and popular education. Thus, audience partic-
ipation is encouraged and the residents of each zona
show up ... in overflow crowds. When asked why
they come, their answer is often simply "to see the
trials." These spectators generally pay close atten-
tion to the proceedings, reacting with "oohs" and
"ahs" at appropriate intervals. One is at first
tempted to conclude that the trials are seen by the
people as merely entertainment, but it is perhaps
more accurate to state that people come because
they are interested, and overflow crowds can be
observed even in zonas where the Popular Tribunal
has been in operation for more than a year.
Whether the Cuban popular tribunals have scored such
a smashing success with the people because of their
serious educational function or simply because they pro-
vide a preferable source of entertainment on warm eve-
nings in Havana does not particularly trouble Berman,
yet it represents one of the few points of reservation in
regard to the effectiveness of the Cuban lower courts he
harbors. One might wonder if there is in fact a contra-
diction between instruction and amusement. Cf BRECHT
ON THEATRE: THE DEVELOPMEN- OF AN AEsIrHEric
72-73 (J. Willett ed. 1964). See also Ball,"The Play's the
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of
Theater, 28 S'AN. L. REv. 81 (1975).
91 Katz, supra note 35, at 90.
92 There is a growing literature on experimental models
of community or neighborhood dispute resolution in the
United States. See Katz, supra note 35; Danzig, Toward
the Creation of a Complement.7y, Decentralized System of Crim-
inal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Danzig & Lowy,
19781
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contrast not only the obvious discrepancies be-
tween the way Cuban and American misdemeanor
courts function, but also the divergent social sys-
tems of the two countries. Tf he Cubans have man-
aged to supersede the Battle Model of criminal
procedure-and the "absolute irreconcilability of
interest between the state and the individual" that
Griffiths considers its essential ideology 9 -only to
the extent that they have achieved popular control
over state power through a widely-publicized, dec-
ade long effort to transform the social structure
and social history of the island.'
It is not acts of faith or a renewed spirit of public
confidence, but rather a genuine sharing of social
wealth and political power, which can alone secure
the kind of democratization of governmental au-
thority that would permit experiments in non-ad-
versary judicial process without risking the trans-
formation of the courts into naked organs of narrow
political interests. Thus, when Francis Allen asserts
that we have repeatedly witnessed the abuse of
state power in this century and Griffiths responds
that "we have also seen enough to render untenable
any assumption of the inevitable malevolence of
state power,"9 5 the reply seems inadequate. We
may also be dissatisfied with Griffiths' contention
that -basic faith in public officials would revolu-
tionize American criminal procedure." 96
Though Karl Llewellyn makes the same criticism
of the Battle Model as Griffiths, suggesting that
"the basic policy-choice is that of distrust of offi-
cials," 9 7 he appears to remain, nevertheless, aware
Everyday Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply
to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAW & Soc. Rrv. 675 (1975);
Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Process-
ing, 9 LAW & Soc. Ri-.v. 63 (1974); Felstiner, Avoidance as
Dirpute Processing: An Elaboration, 9 LAW & Soc. Ri-:v. 695
(1975): Statsky, Communty Courts: Decentralizing Juvenile
Jurisprudence, 3 CAPITAL U. L. Ri-v. 1 (197.1); Tapp &
Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legal-
ity, 27 SIAN. L. RE-:v. 1 (1974).
'
3Griffiths, supra note 57, at 380, 367, 368, 371, 373,
382 and 413.
s' See R. BONACHEA & N. VALDES, CUtBA IN RE'o-
I.tiION (1972): R. DUMONT, CUBA: SOCIALISM AND
DEVE.OPMENT (1970); M. HALPERIN, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF FIDI'. CASTRO (1972); K. KAROL,., GuER.
ILLAS IN POWER (1970): THE NEw CUBA: PARADOXES
AND PoI'EN'IALS (R. Radash ed. 1976); H. MATHEWS,
REVOLt "IION IN CUBA: AN ESSAY IN UNDERS I'ANDING
(1975); RLVOI.IIONARY CHANGE IN CUBA (C. Mesa-
Lago ed. 1971): A. RII'ER, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOP.
ME.NI OF REVOLtJ[IONARY CUBA: STRATEGY AND PER-
FORMANCE (1974).
95 Griffiths, supra note 57, at 381 n.81.
9 Id. at 380.
17 K. LI.EWELLYN. JURISPRUDENCE. supra note 71, at
444.
of the risks involved in substituting a parental
model for a Battle Model of criminal procedure:
As contrasted with arm's-length attitudes, the law,
the procedure, the treatment, the attitudes, the
emotions are parental. There is infinite patience in
the tribunal, infinite long suffering. Typically, also,
there is infinite ultimate inflexibility: it is the of-
fender who will have to do all the ultimate yielding.
The results, 95% of the time, make our results look
weak, uncertain, costly. But when the parental sys-
tem ever goes wrong, the results do raise the hair.
Let officials turn the machinery to work out a
personal grudge; or to enrich themselves corruptly;
or to put down political dissent-and one begins to
understand why our forefathers, through the cen-
turies, found it worth blood to win through to
measures which could partly control officials.98
Therefore, given the present configuration of
American social conflicts and interests, the reform
disposition finds itself trapped between Scylla and
Charybdis: faced on the one hand by a judicial
system where the impartial administration of law
may only mask the inequity of the laws, 9 where
constitutional protections are most available to
those who can afford them t °° and are, as Griffiths
98 Id. at 447-48 (emphasis added).
One ought to be troubled that the criminal-law-that-
is, and the ideology which seems symbiotic with it, can
readily be interpreted as serving mainly the class benefit
of the comfortable middle classes.
If one were to analyze the criminal process itself,
and the "benefits" it has to offer to those who are
exposed to it, it seems to me possible that one might
conclude that the Battle Model ideology rationalizes
and justifies a system whose "balances of advantage"
rules give considerable advantage to middle-class
defendants, but offers precious little protection to
the great bulk of those who are processed by it and
whose offenses are perceived, realistically or not, as
directly threatening the social position of the middle
class.
Griffiths, supra note 57, at 415. See also note 1, supra.
too Harold Laski makes the familiar point that the
constitutional rights and liberties guaranteed by liberal-
ism and the rule of law are precisely those which were
necessitated by the rise of the free market and that the
availability of those rights rarely (and never systemati-
cally) transcends the interests of those who manage the
free market economy: men of property.
H. LASKI, Tile RISE OF LIBERALISM 8-9 (1936):
For what produced liberalism was the emergence of
a new economic society at the end of the middle
ages. As a doctrine, it was shaped by the needs of
that new society; and, like all social philosophies, it
could not transcend the medium in which it was
born.... The individual whom liberalism has sought
to protect is always, so to say, free to purchase his
freedom in the society it made; but the number of
those with the means of purchase at their disposal
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convincingly argues, generally irrelevant "to the
actual experiences of the sorts of people on whom
the system ordinarily operates;"101 yet confronted
on the other hand with the historically transparent
dangers involved in any attempt to graft a non-
adversary model of criminal procedure onto a so-
ciety of inequality and division,' °2 indeed one with
has always been a minority of mankind. The idea of
liberalism, in short, is historically connected, in an
inescapable way, with the ownership of property.
The ends it serves are always the ends of men in this
position. Outside that narrow circle, the individual
for whose rights it has been zealous has always been
an abstraction upon whom its benefits could not, in
fact, be fully conferred. Because its purposes were
shaped by owners of property, the margins between
its claims and its performance have always been
wide.
101 Griffiths, supra note 57, at 415-16:
The Battle Model's lack of concern for what follows
conviction-its reliance on social exile-perhaps re-
sponds to an accurate perception of what is, for the
middle classes, unimportant. The Due Process
Model in particular-the Model, as Packer says, of
the "schools," of liberal intellectuals and enlightened
judges and lawyers-sometimes seem mostly a re-
flection of a vaguely left-wing concern about politi-
cal prosecutions, rather than a response to the actual
experiences of the sorts of people on whom the
system ordinarily operates. Surely the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, and all of their refinements, are
fairly marginal in the actual administration of crim-
inal justice; what is not marginal is the way ordinary
defendants are treated during the process, and what
happens to them afterwards. It is this reality which
is so grim, which affects mainly the poor, and which
the ideology of the Battle Model serves conveniently
to explain, to excuse, and to justify.
See also Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies
in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062, 1078.
102 Anthropologist Stanley Diamond emphasizes the
importance of adfersarial procedures in the defense of
the citizen as a person against the state. He asserts that
the intricacies of procedure, while not guaranteeing jus-
tice under law, ievertheless constitute the individual's
last line of defense. See Diamond, The Role of Law Versus
the Order of Custom in THE SOCIAL ORGANIZArION OF
LAW (D. Black & M. Mileski eds. 1973) 318, 338-39:
The major focus of the defense of the citizen as a
person can only be on procedure or, as we call it in
our own society, due process. ... As every intelligent
lawyer knows, the substance of the law can hardly
be assimilated to morality. It is clear, therefore, why
von Jhering (1866: Vol. 2471) insisted that "form is
the sworn enemy of unlimited discretion (of the
sovereign power) and the twin sister of freedom."
The degrees of theft or homicide, the question of
double jeopardy, habeas corpus, the right to counsel,
the question of legitimate witness, trial by jury and
the selection of jurors, protection against summary
search and seizure, the very division between civil
and criminal law-these intricacies of procedure are
a recent experience of extraordinary irresponsibil-
ity in the highest echelons of state power.
In a society where the non-adversary model of
criminal adjudication works, it may be the best of
all possible systems of criminal process. In situa-
tions where an objective social basis for the identity
of interest between the state and the individual is
lacking, the non-Battle Model of criminal proce-
dure may well result in the Crime Control Model
par excellence.1
03
CONCLUSION
This article first attempts to demonstrate the
necessity of trying to understand the ebb and flow
of lower criminal court reform sentiment in relation
to historical periods of general concern regarding
social stability. The point is not to match mechan-
ically developments in legal thought and analysis
with neatly organized historical periods. It is rather
to ask whether the relationship between lower court
visibility and perceived crises in the social order
may not reveal something about the assumptions
upon which the reform commitment is based and
to suggest sorhe of the internal weaknesses of the
reformist critiques.
Next, an effort is made to focus specifically on
the contrast between judicial theory and courtroom
practice in the right to counsel area, in order to
provide a sense of what the lower courts actually
look like from a "ground-floor" level and to point
out how such an analysis can provide different
the primary, but far from absolute, assurance of what-
ever justice can be obtained under the rule of law.
... Procedure is the individual's last line of defense
in contemporary civilization, wherein all other as-
sociations to which he may belong have become
subordinate to the state. The elaboration of proce-
dure then, is a unique, if fragile, feature of more
fully evolved states, in compensation, so to speak,.for
the radical isolation of the individual. [Italics added]
103 Although it cannot be denied that the parental
ideology fits some systems known to history, these
procedural systems can be found either in tribal
cultures or in those modern societies that attempt to
restrain antisocial conduct independently of state
authority. While in the first case no state has yet
developed, it is claimed in the second that the state
is moribund, and new reactions to unacceptable
behaviour are harbingers of the stateless future. But
from the moment the state appears as a factor of any
significance until such time as it actually withers
away, the parental ideology may rightly be regarded
with some circumspection, for it may provide a
rationalization for the most brutal kinds of govern-
mental oppression [Footnotes deleted].
Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 531 (1975).
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kinds of information from the standard variety of
legal analysis. New perspectives may be gained
which will challenge previous reform assumptions
or provide more concrete illustrations of why the
lower criminal courts do not function effectively.
Finally, the article explores the theoretical rea-
sons why it is insufficient to begin directly elimi-
nating obstacles to lower court effectiveness once
they have been accurately identified through the
most methodologically vigorous analysis. It re-
mains for the analyst or reformer to stand back
and self-consciously examine the theoretical impli-
cations of his strategy for changing lower criminal
court procedure. Without this kind of self-aware-
ness, the reform effort may be expended in a futile
attempt to substitute legal solutions for necessarily
social ones, or conversely, to solve a legal problem
while creating a political nightmare.
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